








Government communication  is now a  large growth  industry  in many countries. 
Exactly what  is meant  by  the  term,  however,  varies  from author  to  author.  In 
this  paper  government  communication  is  conceived  as  a  policy  tool  or 
instrument,  that  is, as a means  to give effect  to policy goals. Three key policy‐
relevant  aspects  of  the  term  are  examined:  (1)  the  link  between  government 
communications  and  the  ‘nodality’  or  information  resource  set  out  by Hood  in 
his  study  of  policy  instruments;  (2)  the  role  of  government  communications  in 
the ‘front‐end’ of the public policy and production processes related to agenda‐
setting, policy formulation and producer activities as opposed to the ‘back‐end’ 
of policy  implementation, policy  evaluation,,  consumption and distribution and 
(3)  the  general  aims  of  network  management  and  overcoming  information 
asymmetries which help explain the range of procedural and substantive policy 
tools used in government communication efforts. A model of four basic types of 
government  communications  is  developed  and  examples  provided  of  each 
general  category.  The  implications  of  this  analysis  for  cross‐national 




Current  governance  modes  have  been  shifting  increasingly  towards  a  pro‐consultation  mode 
which  has  led  to  the  internalization  and mandating  of  new  communication  practices  in many 













is now a  large growth  industry  in many countries and the subject of  increasing attention from 
both practitioners and theorists. 
Government communications are typically thought of as the 'sermons'  in a  'carrots, sticks, and 
sermons'  formulation  of  basic  policy  instrument  types  (Vedung  and  ven  der  Doelen  1998). 
Vedung, for example, has defined a ‘sermon’ as: 
“Efforts  to use  the knowledge and data available  to governments  to  influence 





are  indicative  of  the  need  to  be  more  precise  in  what  is  meant  by  the  term  ‘government 
communication’. Different foci make assessments and generalizations about trends and patterns 
of use exceedingly difficult (Ledingham 2003). Nevertheless. classifying and analyzing the  wide 
range  of  activities  and  tasks  that  fall  into  the  category  of  ‘government  communication’  is  an 




Exactly what  is meant  by  the  term  ‘government  communication’  currently  varies  dramatically 
from author to author, ranging from its association with all forms of political activity (Deutsch, 
1963; Bang 2003) to a very specific focus on one limited type of activity, like political advertising 




purposes  of  government  communication,  a  first  step  towards  establishing  a  typology  of  such 
activities; itself the first step towards effective empirical analysis and theory construction. That 
is,  ‘government  communication’  can  be  thought  of  as  a  generic  name  for  a wide  variety  of  a 
specific  type  or  category  of  governing  instruments,  ones  which  typically  draw  upon  what 
Christopher Hood (1986) called ‘nodality’ or the use of government informational resources to 
influence  and  direct  policy  actions  through  the  provision  or  withholding  of  ‘information’  or 
‘knowledge’ from societal actors.  
As is well known, Hood (1983; 1986; 2007; Hood and Margetts 2007) argued that governments 
have  essentially  four  resources  at  their  disposal  ‐  nodality,  authority,  treasure,  and  
organizational (or ‘NATO’  in Hood’s terminology) ‐ which they use to monitor society and alter 
its  behaviour.  In Hood’s  scheme,  instruments  are  grouped  together  according  to  (1) which  of 
these resources they primarily rely upon for their effectiveness2 and (2) whether the instrument 






































better describe  and  classify  the  various different  techniques practiced by  governments  in  this 







behaviour  in  economic  transactions,  and  controlling  or  collecting  information  for  politico‐
administrative  ones.    That  is,  a  primary  distinction  can  be  made  between  whether  the 




Substantive  instruments  are  used  to  alter  some  aspect  of  the  production,  distribution  and 
delivery of goods and services in society: broadly conceived to include both mundane goods and 
services  (like  school  lunches) as well  as a  range of  vices and virtues,  ranging  from crude vices 
(such  as  gambling  or  illicit  drug  use)  to  more  common  individual  virtues  (such  as  charitable 
giving or volunteer work with the physically challenged); to the attainment of sublime collective 











nodes  (actors)  and  links  (relationships),  but  which  can  result  in  very  complex  structures  and 
interaction patterns. Policy networks include sets of formal institutional and informal relational 
linkages between governmental  and other policy  actors which  are  typically  structured around 
shared beliefs and interests in public policy making and implementation. In order to pursue their 
preferred  policy  initiatives,  governments must  interact  with  other  state  and  non‐state  actors 
who might  possess  diverging  interests  (Leik  1992).  They  use  procedural  communicative  tools 
based on government information resources in order to attempt to alter the behaviour of policy 
network  members  involved  in  policy‐making  processes.  They  are  only  tangentially  related  to 
productive or consumptive behaviour, if at all.  
Distinguishing  Between  the  Use  of  Government  Communication  Instruments  at 
Different Stages of the Policy and Production Processes 
Making  a distinction between procedural  and  substantive  communication  tools  is  a  good  first 
step  in  arriving  at  a  reasonable  taxonomy  of  such  instruments  which  can  inform  empirical 
analysis  and  theory‐building.  However  there  is  a  second  dimension  which  also  requires 
elaboration:  the  stage  of  the  production  process  or  policy  cycle  upon  which  different 
communication tools focus (Howlett 2009).5 
Many studies of procedural information tool use, for example, focus on the role of government 
communications  as  part  of  the  agenda‐setting  process  in  government  (Mikenberg  2001; 
Sulitzeanu‐Kenan 2007) or on  its  role  in policy  implementation  (Salmon 1989a, 1989b).  In  the 
case  of  production  processes  the  focus  has  also  been  upon  specific  stages  of  production 
processes,  such  as  the  effort  to  affect  consumption  activities  and  actors  or  those  involved  in 
productive or distributive activities. These are all quite different  roles, however, and they also 
should  be  carefully  distinguished  from  each  other  in  order  to  understand  the  links  that  exist 
between  government  communication  strategies  and  activities  and  policy  outcomes  such  as 
accountability and policy efficacy.  
In general, substantive communication tools can be focused primarily either at the ‘front‐end’ or 





















    Policy Purpose   























































The most  high  profile  and  thus most  commonly  observed  and  chronicled    type  of  tool  is  the 
substantive, back‐end tool focused on the effort to alter consumer behaviour: the government 
information  campaign.  This  includes  various  campaigns  waged  by  governments  to  encourage 
citizens  to,  for  example,  eat  well,  engage  in  fewer  vices  and  otherwise  behave  responsibly. 





The  most  commonly  observed  and  chronicled  category  of  procedural  tool  is  the  front‐end 










data  collection,  surveys  and,  increasingly,  government  websites  (Gandy,  1982;  Hood  and 
Margetts,  2007)  to  provide  additional  information  to  policy  network  members  in  specific 
sectoral or issue areas. 







Some  notification  tools  attempt  to  be  purely  factual,  ongoing  and  passive  in  nature,  such  as 
nutritional  labeling  on  foodstuffs  or  health  warnings  on  cigarettes  (Padberg  1992;  Baksi  and 
Bose 2007). They are usually enacted in regulations (i.e. disclosure is mandatory) and are aimed 
at  providing  information  to  consumers  allowing  them  make  better  decisions,  or  overcome 
information  asymmetries  (Jahn  et  al  2005)  between  producers  and  consumers,  with  the 
expectation  that  they  will  change  their  behaviour  in  some  way  consistent  with  government 
goals  –  for  example,  reducing  smoking  or  eating  nutritional  foods.  All  of  these  activities  are 
intended to have an effect on producers and production decisions, for example, manufacturing 
fewer tobacco products or producing healthier foods. 
Similarly  Stanbury  and  Fulton  (1984)  describe  ‘moral  suasion’  as  a  more  direct  plea  from 
governments  to  producers  “whereby  voluntary  action  is  urged  under  threat  of  coercion  if 
refused”. Many countries administer important aspects of their financial systems in this fashion, 
for example, asking banks, taxpayers and other financial institutions to act in a certain way (e.g. 
keep  interest  rates  low,  or  allow  certain  groups  to  borrow  funds) with  the  implicit  or  explicit 
threat of direct government regulation if requests are ignored or go unfulfilled (Bardach 1989). 
Substantive Consumer‐Directed Tools: Exhortation and Persuasion Instruments 
Adler  &  Pittle  (1984)  provide  a  definition  of  substantive,  information‐based,  ‘back‐end’  tools 
directed  at  consumers  as  "persuasion  instruments" which  entail  “persuasion  schemes  (which) 
convey  messages  which  may  or  may  not  contain  factual  information  which  overtly  seek  to 
motivate target audiences to modify their behaviour” (Adler and Pittle 1984). 
These are probably the best known government communication tools. The most prominent type 









category,  by  definition,  and  tend  to  be  aimed  less  at  producers  than  at  consumers.  Some  of 
these information campaigns are more active and less factual, but have the same intent, that is 
providing  social  actors  with  more  information  about  aspects  of  their  behaviour  and  its 
advantageous or deleterious quality, urging enhancement of the former and a diminishment of 
the  latter.  Such  campaigns  are  often  conducted  at  the mass  level  and  use  a  variety  of mass‐
media delivery mechanisms (commercials, broadcasts, newspaper advertisements and the like). 
High  profile  campaigns  in  many  countries  to  prevent  drinking  and  driving  or  encourage  the 
purchase of Victory Bonds during wartime are good examples of this kind of instrument.  
Mass  campaigns  began  with  the  emergence  of  mass  media  and  are  now  common  in  most 
countries. The information often transmitted through information instruments is not always so 
factual, however, but can be used to  ‘sell’ a government’s policies  in the same way that other 
products  are  marketed.  Many  national  governments  are  now  the  largest  purchasers  of 
advertising  in  their  countries and  far outstrip national brands well  known  for  their advertising 
overkill,  such  as  alcoholic  beverage  and  softdrink  companies,  as  well  as  fastfood  chains.  The 
Federal  government  of  Canada,  for  example,  has  been  the  largest  advertiser  in  country  since 





Government of Canada  to  introduce a new Goods and Services Tax  in 1989‐1990. They  found 
the  federal  Department  of  Finance  to  have  spent    $11.6  million  on  public  education  in  a 
combined print/radio/tv campaign, $5M on direct mail materials, $5M on a call centre; Revenue 
Canada (Customs) to have spent 10.6M on advertizing, 9.2M on instructional material; Revenue 
Canada  (taxation)  to  have  spent  a  further  $28M  advertising  a  GST  credit;  while  a  specially 
created GST  Consumer  Info Office  spent  $7.4M on  advertising  and  $6.9M of  production,  The 
total  for  this  one  campaign  was  $85  million.  This  was  more  than  largest  private  sector 
advertisers    spent  in  all  of  1989.  For  example,  Proctor  and  Gamble,  with  its  hundreds  of 
consumer products, had a total advertising budget of $56.7 Million.  





can  involve  information bans or release prevention as well as  information disclosure; they can 




disclosure)  and  (access  to  information)  allowing access  to documents and  records of others,  ‐ 
with  numerous  exemptions  ‐  again  many  benign  (to  protect  individuals  from  unnecessary 






1970s  and  1980s  (Relyea  1977;  Bennett  1988,  1990,  1991,  1992;  Bennett  and  Raab  2003; 
Bennett and Bayley 1999; Howe and Johnson 2000). Whistleblower Acts are an extreme example 
of  the  use  of  communication  tools  focused  at  the  individual  level.  They  are  bills  intended  to 
protect people who speak out about problems in the government's bureaucracy. Through such 
legislation,  bureaucrats  are  often  offered  legal  protection  against  reprisals  for  reporting 
government wrongdoing.   
There  is  also  a wide  range of  these  tools  designed  to  protect  certain  kinds  of  information on 
government activities or  in  government  files  from entering  the public  realm or  in  suppressing 
certain  knowledge  or  information  considered  undesirable.  These  include  protecting  not  only 
information collected by governments but that which comes into their possession (for example 
from foreign government or via documents filed in court cases etc.). These range from wartime 
(and  peacetime  e.g.  Ontario  film  censors  board)  censorship  and  bans  on  political  parties  and 
speech (e.g. hate crimes  legislation etc.)  to Official Secrets Acts  (like UK) with various  levels of 
confidentiality and penalties imposed for publicizing or releasing government secrets.7  
Procedural  Tools  for  Policy  Implementation  and  Evaluation:  Data  Collection  and 
Release 
Stanbury  and  Fulton  (1984)  also  discuss  several  tools  in  which  affected  parties  are  given 
information  on  government  plans,  like  public  hearings;  the  discrete  use  of  confidential 
information  such  as  planned  leaks  to  press  or  planned  public  disclosure  of  government 
intentions;  as well  as government media  relations and  communications  strategies  intended  to 
legitimize government actions and pre‐empt criticism and dissent.  
Some of  these  tools  are used  in order  to generate  information,  such as  inquiries,  surveys and 
polling. Government  information requests can be very  focused and can be quite secretive  (for 
example,  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  9‐11  airline  hijackings when  the US  government 
urged credit card companies to provide records of suspicious activities by suspected hijackers). 
Benchmarking and performance  indicators  are more  visible but  similar  tools  involving  the use 
and  publication  of  indicators  of  government  and  non‐governmental  performance  designed  to 
collect  and  release  information  on  specified  activities  of  organizations  against  set  written 





legislation  devoted  to  this  subject,  usually with  a  focus  on  protecting  personal  information  in 
areas such as health, financial or tax matters, and with respect to criminal proceedings. 
Conclusion: General Comments and Patterns of Use 
As  has  been  set  out  above,  there  are  many  different  kinds  of  government  communication 
activities  and  the  lack  of  an  effective  taxonomy  or  framework  for  their  analysis  has  made 
generalizing about their impact and patterns of use quite difficult. Conceiving of such activities 





different  instruments  and  helps  develop  a  relatively  parsimonious  taxonomy  of  their  major 
types which can facilitate national and cross‐national studies of their use and impact. 
Distinguishing between information tools that are procedural or substantive  in nature  is a first 
step  in  the  development  of  this  taxonomy.  The  second  step  is  to  distinguish  between  those 
procedural  and  substantive  instruments  that  focus  on  the  front‐end  of  policy  and  production 
processes and those which focus on the back‐end. Taken together these two criteria reveal four 
distinct  types  of  communication  instruments:  product  information;  consumer  information 
campaigns; general disclosure tools and data collection and release tools.  
Classifying communications instruments in this way is the first step towards the development of 
empirical  assessments  of  the  rationale  for  their  use  and    uncovering  any  patterns  of  their 
employment,  both  spatially  (cross‐nationally)  and  temporally  (historically).  Hypotheses 
suggested  in  the  literature,  for  example,  include  the  arguments  that  information  instruments 
will tend to be used only in situation where: 
(1) 100% compliance is not required for a policy to be effective;  





(5)  the  issue  in  question  is  not  very  complex  (technological  or  legal)  in  nature  but  can  be 
reduced to the level of advertising slogans (Romans 1966; Vedung and van der Doelen 1998). 
Organizing case studies according to the criteria set out above helps to evaluate this and other 





direction  involve  trade‐offs  between  some  rights  such  as  the  public’s  ‘right‐to‐know’  and  state 
security  issues or  an  individual’s  right  to privacy. Any  general  diminishment of  state power  can be 
reversed  in  times  of  war  or  crisis,  as  has  been  the  case  in  many  countries  in  the  post  9‐11 
environment of the U.S.‐led ‘war on terror’ where concerns with state and collective security in times 














4  At  their  most  basic  level,  government  actions  fall  into  two  types  depending  on  their  general  goal 
orientation: one type of action proposes to alter the actual substance of the kinds of activities carried 
out  by  citizens  going  about  their  day‐to‐day  tasks,  while  the  other  focuses  more  upon  altering 
behaviour  in  the  policy‐making  process  itself.  'Procedural'  policy  tools  are  used  to  accomplish  the 
latter purposes, while 'substantive' policy instruments are those used to affect the former (Howlett, 
2000). 
5 The different stages of  the production process are well known and do not  require  further elaboration 
here.  However  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the  policy  process.  While  different  models  of  policy 
processes  exist,  historically,  one of  the most  popular means  for  analyzing public  policy‐making has 
been to think of it as a set of interrelated stages through which policy issues and deliberations flow in 
a  more  or  less  sequential  fashion  from  ‘inputs’  (problems)  to  ‘outputs’  (policies).  The  resulting 
sequence of stages is often referred to as the ‘policy cycle’ (Jann and Wegrich, 2007). In this model, 
agenda‐setting refers to the process by which problems come to the attention of governments; policy 
formulation  refers  to how policy options are  formulated within government; decision‐making  is  the 
process  by  which  governments  adopt  a  particular  course  of  action  or  non‐action;  policy 
implementation  relates to how governments put policies  into effect; and policy evaluation  refers to 
the processes by which  the  results of policies are monitored by both  state and  societal  actors,  the 
outcome of which may be reconceptualization of policy problems and solutions. 
6  As  Hood  (1986)  noted,  all  policy  tools  can  be  targeted  at  different  levels  of  society.  In  the  case  of 
information‐based tools, Adler & Pittle (1986) have suggested a division along the  lines of targeting 
individuals, groups and populations as a whole. 
7  Censorship  has  occurred  in many  countries  during wartime but  also  in  peacetime e.g.  film or  theatre 
censorship.  This  latter  use  has  been  slowly whittled  away  as  individual  rights  in  democratic  states 
have been  ruled  to  trump government or  collective  ones  (Qualter  1985). However, Official  Secrets 
Acts are the most important statute relating to national security in many countries and are designed 
to prohibit  and  control  access  to and  the disclosure of  sensitive government  information  (Pasquier 
and  Villeneuve  2007).  Offences  tends  to  cover  espionage  and  leakage  of  government  information. 
The  term  "official  secrets"  varies  dramatically  from  country  to  country  but  broadly,  allows 
governments  to  classify documents and prohibit  release of different  categories  for  sometimes very 
long periods of time (e.g. 50‐75 years). 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